| 股权分置条件下委托代理关系中的博弈 |
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| 引用本文： | 陆佳,王建明,曹金融. 股权分置条件下委托代理关系中的博弈[J]. 商业研究, 2005, 0(20): 44-47 |
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| 作者姓名： | 陆佳 王建明 曹金融 |
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| 作者单位： | 南京工业大学,经济管理学院,江苏,南京,210009 |
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| 摘 要： | 传统的委托代理理论是委托人和代理人在完全理性的情况下,各自可能出现的各种行为选择,以及最终双方博弈形成的纳什均衡,然而,由于我国的上市公司的股权状态并不符合传统理论中的假设条件,则委托人和代理人必然会在行为选择上发生偏移。因此,对股权分置条件下的委托代理关系中主体行为选择的偏移一一阐述。
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| 关 键 词： | 股权分置 博弈 委托代理理论 |
| 文章编号： | 1001-148X(2005)20-0044-04 |
| 收稿时间： | 2004-09-09 |
| 修稿时间： | 2004-09-09 |
Game Between Principal and Agent Onder Share Separation |
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| LU Jia,WANG Jian-ming,CAO Jin-rong. Game Between Principal and Agent Onder Share Separation[J]. Commercial Research, 2005, 0(20): 44-47 |
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| Authors: | LU Jia WANG Jian-ming CAO Jin-rong |
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| Affiliation: | School of Economics, Nanjing University of Technology, Nanjing, Jiangsu 210009, China |
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| Abstract: | This paper discusses the classic theory of principal and agent, and explorers the possible choices of shareholders and agent under Nash equilibrium When the shne conditions to in chinese corporations cannot accord with the established hypothesis in the classic theory, shareholders and agent will have to adjust their choices. The paper explain the adjustment of the choices of shareholders and agent. |
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| Keywords: | of separation share game theory theory of principal and agent |
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