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Litigation,liability, and incentives for care
Affiliation:1. Amsterdam School of Economics and ACLE, University of Amsterdam, Plantage Muidergracht 12, Amsterdam 1018TV, The Netherlands;2. Coller School of Management, Tel Aviv University, Ramat Aviv, Tel Aviv 69978, Israel;1. Vanderbilt University, United States;2. National Bureau of Economic Research, United States
Abstract:In this paper, potential injurers are subject to a negligence standard and differ in cost of taking care; in the event of accident, the injurer's degree of care is private information in litigation that follows. Award of damages for pain and suffering will lead to a general increase in care and hence reduce the likehood of accident. A tighter negligence standard will lead some potential injurers to take more care and others to take less. Adoption of a rule under which the loser at trial must pay the litigation costs of the winner will reduce the pressure for punitive damages.
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