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人格化交易习俗下我国存款保险制度的现实选择
引用本文:李世美,胡春燕. 人格化交易习俗下我国存款保险制度的现实选择[J]. 特区经济, 2006, 0(6): 67-68
作者姓名:李世美  胡春燕
作者单位:1. 华南师范大学南海校区,经济与管理系,广东,南海,528225
2. 桂林电子科技大学,电子工程系,广西,桂林,541004
摘    要:本文采用历史制度分析方法,论述了我国由于受到人格化交易习俗文化约束,政府信用对市场信用具有重要的替代效应。存款保险制度是由政府提供的一种有别于商业保险的“准公共”保险产品。隐性存款保险制度和显性存款保险制度具有同质性,隐性存款保险制度是我国维持金融体系稳定的一种次优选择。所以我国暂时没有必要引入显性的存款保险制度。

关 键 词:人格化交易习俗  显性存款保险制度  “准公共”保险产品

China deposit insurance system''''s reality selection under personification trade convention
Li Shi Mei,Hu Chun Yan. China deposit insurance system''''s reality selection under personification trade convention[J]. Special Zone Economy, 2006, 0(6): 67-68
Authors:Li Shi Mei  Hu Chun Yan
Abstract:In a way of historical and institutional analysis,this paper tells us the government credit is an important substitute for the market credit because of the personalized trading custom in ChinaThe deposit insurance system is a “quasi-public”insurance product which is different from the commercial insuranceAt present,the implicit deposit insurance system is a superior choice to keep china's finance stabilization because the explicit deposit insurance system is homogeneous with the explicit deposit insurance systemSo China need not have to carry out the explicit deposit insurance system
Keywords:explicit deposit insurance system  personalized trading custom  a “quasi-public”insurance product
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