激励增强、效率提高与内部人控制的加深——一个关于管理者收购(MBO)的假设性诠释及其应用 |
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引用本文: | 匡绪辉,马维胜. 激励增强、效率提高与内部人控制的加深——一个关于管理者收购(MBO)的假设性诠释及其应用[J]. 武汉金融, 2003, 0(11): 25-28 |
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作者姓名: | 匡绪辉 马维胜 |
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作者单位: | 湖北省社会科学院经济所,湖北武汉,430077 |
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摘 要: | MBO是在我国国有企业和上市公司改革进入新阶段而从国外引进的新事物。通过MBO能够改善我国国有企业和上市公司的股权结构,增强国有企业和上市公司的经营者激励力度,从而实现国退民进,增加社会福利。但是MBO的实施会导致可能的国有资产流失、新的内部人控制等问题。如何衡量MBO的利弊成为理论和实践界的难题。本文分析了实施MBO的权益替代效应,并提出了我国进行MBO的基本框架。
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关 键 词: | MBO 激励 内部人控制 股东控制力 |
文章编号: | 1009-3540(2003)11-0025-0004 |
激励增强?效率提高与内部人控制的加深——一个关于管理者收购(MBO)的假设性诠释及其应用 |
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Abstract: | As the state-owned enterprise of our country and listed company reform enters new stage that MBO introduced from foreign countries.Through it,can im-prove the structure of stock right of the state -owned enterprise of our country and listed company,strengthens the state-owned enterprise and listed company encourages dynamics,thus increase the social welfare.But such ques-tions as the implementation of MBO can lead to the fact the possible state-run losses of assets,new inside people to control.How to weigh the pros and cons of MBO become the difficult problem of the circle of theory and practice.This text has analysed that the rights and inter-ests of implementing MBO substitute the effect,and has proposed the basic frame of MBO of our country carries. |
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Keywords: | MBO |
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