Existence of valuation equilibria when equilibrium strategies cannot differentiate between equal ties |
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| Authors: | Philipp C. Wichardt |
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| Affiliation: | 1. The Ohio State University, United States;2. Kiel Institute, Germany;3. Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, Germany;1. Department of Economics, Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI, 48824, United States;2. The Research Institute of Industrial Economics, Box 55665, SE-102 15 Stockholm, Sweden;3. Department of Economics, P.O. Box 7082, SE-220 07 Lund, Sweden;4. Nottingham Centre for Research on Globalisation and Economic Policy, Sir Clive Granger Building, University of Nottingham, University Park, Nottingham, NG7 2RD |
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| Abstract: | This paper reconsiders the valuation equilibrium concept (Jehiel and Samet, 2007) and proposes an additional regularity condition concerning the players? equilibrium strategies. The condition, which requires equilibrium strategies to induce the same local behaviour at all nodes with “similar” optimal actions, increases both the predictive power and the internal consistency of the concept — especially when used as a tool to study boundedly rational behaviour in games with imperfect information and/or imperfect recall. It is shown not to conflict with existence. |
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