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Job search incentives and job match quality
Authors:Simen Gaure  Knut Røed  Lars Westlie
Affiliation:1. FU Berlin, RWI, and IZA FU Berlin, Boltzmannstr. 20, 14195 Berlin, Germany;2. RWI, and IZA RWI, Invalidenstr. 112, 10115 Berlin, Germany;1. National University of Singapore;2. University of Nottingham;1. THEMA, Université de Cergy-Pontoise, France;2. GAINS-TEPP, Université du Maine and EDHEC Business School, France;1. IESE Business School, Universidad de Navarra, Av Pearson, 21, Barcelona 08034, Spain;2. University of Pennsylvania School of Social Policy & Practice, and NBER, 3701 Locust Walk, Philadelphia PA, 19104-6214, USA;3. University of Utah Department of Economics, 260 Central Campus Drive #4100, Salt Lake City, UT 84111, USA;4. Burning Glass Technologies, One Lewis Wharf Boston MA 02110 USA
Abstract:We examine the impacts of time-limited unemployment insurance (UI) and active labor market programs (ALMP) on the duration and outcome of job search in Norway. We use a comprehensive simultaneous equations model accounting for i) the duration of unemployment spells; ii) their outcomes, iii) subsequent employment stability; and iv) the earnings level associated with the first job. We find that time invested in job search pays off in form of higher earnings once a job match is formed. ALMP raises the probability of eventually finding a job as well as expected earnings, but at the cost of lengthening job search.
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