公司治理与代理成本关系研究

我国上市公司的代理问题和治理机制的效率受到公司控制权性质和成长机会的显著影响,表现在国有控股公司或低成长机会的上市公司的代理问题显得较为突出;管理层持股在国有控股上市公司中不具有治理效用,而独立董事在非国有控股上市公司中未发挥治理作用;大股东监控和短期债务融资在低成本机会的公司中具有明显的治理作用。

Corporate Governance and Agency Cost

The issue of agency and the efficiency of governance in China's listed companies is heavily influenced by the nature of control power and growing opportunities.As a result,state-holding companies or listed companies with fewer growing opportunities are distinctively bothered by the issue of agency.Management stock ownership does not have any governance effect in state-holding companies nor does independent director play a role in the governance of non-state-holding companies.But the supervision by major shareholders and short-term debt financing play a distinct role in the governance of companies with fewer growing opportunities.