Multiple agency perspective,family control,and private information abuse in an emerging economy |
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Authors: | Igor Filatotchev Xiaoxiang Zhang Jenifer Piesse |
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Institution: | (1) Sir John Cass Business School, City University London, 106 Bunhill Row, London, EC1Y 8TZ, UK;(2) Economics University of Vienna, Vienna, Austria;(3) Newcastle Business School, Northumbria University, Newcastle Upon Tyne, NE1 8ST, UK;(4) Department of Management, King’s College London, London, UK;(5) University of Stellenbosch, Stellenbosch, South Africa |
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Abstract: | Using a comprehensive sample of listed companies in Hong Kong this paper investigates how family control affects private information
abuses and firm performance in emerging economies. We combine research on stock market microstructure with more recent studies
of multiple agency perspectives and argue that family ownership and control over the board increases the risk of private information
abuse. This, in turn, has a negative impact on stock market performance. Family control is associated with an incentive to
distort information disclosure to minority shareholders and obtain private benefits of control. However, the multiple agency
roles of controlling families may have different governance properties in terms of investors’ perceptions of private information
abuse. These findings contribute to our understanding of the conflicting evidence on the governance role of family control
within a multiple agency perspective. |
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