战略性新兴产业发展中的区域竞争与地方政府补贴

本文构建理论模型剖析地方政府产业补贴政策的形成机制和经济效应,并利用实证分析方法揭示地方政府产业补贴率与区域生产成本的关系。理论分析表明, 当地方政府产量偏好相同时，生产成本优势越明显的地区，地方政府产业补贴率应越高。但如果高成本地区的产量偏好远大于低成本地区，高成本地区地方产业补贴率就会大于低成本地区。实证检验结果显示，中国地方政府产业补贴率与生产成本正相关，说明地方政府产业补贴政策存在逆成本优势选择现象。［关键词］产业政策; 区域竞争; 政府补贴; 新兴产业

REGIONAL COMPETITION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT SUBSIDY IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF STRATEGIC EMERGING INDUSTRIES

This paper reveals the local government behaviors of industrial subsidies in regional competition and their economic effects through a theoretical model. In addition, the relation between the rate of regional subsidies on emerging industries and regional production cost is also examined empirically. The results indicate that the subsidy rate in the regions with lower production cost should be larger than others if there is no difference in scale preference among regions. However, if the scale preference of local government in regions without cost advantages is much stronger than others, the subsidy rate in regions without cost advantage will be larger than other regions. The empirical studies show that local governments in China prefer to subside more to those industries without cost advantages.