投资者风险偏好、平台行为选择与P2P监管*

本文通过构造一个包含投资者、贷款者和P2P平台三方的网络借贷模型，关注投资风险偏好程度和平台中介费率对三方行为的影响，并分析了提高融资成功率和平台稳定运营的条件，同时指出了平台道德风险行为存在的可能。基于上述分析，本文提出：P2P运营风险不仅来自于贷款方，也与投资者的风险偏好相关，平台和监管机构应关注投资者的类型选择。平台企业的中介费率选择是平衡三方利益和融资成功率的有效手段，应赋予平台企业充分的定价权。作为监管机构的政府，强化资产隔离制度，提高对平台企业的审查和惩罚力度，是管理P2P行业的最根本的手段，但不应对P2P平台的定价和运营模式的创新设置过多限制。

RISK PREFERENCE OF LENDER,BEHAVIOR CHOICE OF PLATFORM AND P2P LENDING REGULATION

By constructing a network lending model including lender, borrower and P2P platform, this paper analyses the influence of risk preference of lender and intermediary fee on the behavior of these three partiesWe clarified the conditions of successful finance on P2P platform and its stable operation.Meanwhile, we pointed the possibility of P2P platforms moral hazardOur conclusion is as follows: the risks of P2P finance not only come from borrower, but also have relationship with the risk preference of lender, so the platform and the regulators should screen the investors. Intermediary fee is an effective tool to balance the benefit of three parties, the regulators should give enough space for price setting. Establishing the asset isolation system, and strengthen the inspection and punishment are the fundamental way to reduce the P2P risk, however, the regulators should not put tight restrictions on pricing and model innovation.