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上市公司再融资监管的博弈分析
引用本文:范小清,周伟贤.上市公司再融资监管的博弈分析[J].特区经济,2006,211(8):100-101.
作者姓名:范小清  周伟贤
作者单位:江西财经大学,江西,南昌,330013
摘    要:金融监管部门的再融资政策不够合理稳定、监管措施不当是造成我国上市公司再融资造假盛行、再融资效率低下的主要原因。因此为保证再融资监管的有效性,监管政策应保持持续性和前瞻性,同时改进监管方式、降低监管成本,实现独立监管,形成一套再融资市场的合理激励-约束机制。

关 键 词:金融监管  再融资  博弈分析

Game playing analysis of listed company's financing supervision
Fan Xiao Qing,Zhou Wei Xian.Game playing analysis of listed company''''s financing supervision[J].Special Zone Economy,2006,211(8):100-101.
Authors:Fan Xiao Qing  Zhou Wei Xian
Institution:Fan Xiao Qing Zhou Wei Xian
Abstract:The paper is based on the regulation of refinance of listed companys to analyze the adverse effect when the regulation of refinance often changes on the stock market.We establish a simple model to analyze that the influence factor lead to regulate inefficiently,and get the conclusion that the lasting and perspective of the regulation policy,the independent and strict regulation are the effective measure to keep financial stability.
Keywords:financial regulation  refinance  gamble analysis
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