Coordination of a socially responsible supply chain using revenue sharing contract |
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| Affiliation: | 1. School of Business IT and Logistics, College of Business, RMIT University, 124 La Trobe Street, Melbourne, VIC 3000, Australia;2. College of Economics and Management, Fuzhou University, Fuzhou, Fujian 350116, China;3. Odette School of Business, University of Windsor, 401 Sunset Ave., Windsor, Ontario N9B 3P4, Canada;1. School of Management and Economics, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu 611731, China;2. Department of Management, University of Bristol, Bristol BS8 1TZ, UK;3. Nottingham University Business School China, University of Nottingham Ningbo China, 199 Taikang East Road, Ningbo 315100, China;1. Department of Mathematics, University of Kalyani, Kalyani, 741235, West Bengal, India;2. Department of Mathematics, Bengal Institute of Technology, 1. No. Govt. Colony, Kolkata, 700150, India;3. Department of Mathematics, Bhangar Mahavidyalaya, Bhangar, 743502, South 24 Parganas, India;1. School of Industrial Engineering, Iran University of Science and Technology, Tehran, Iran;2. School of Industrial Engineering, College of Engineering, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran |
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| Abstract: | This paper explores coordination of a corporate social responsible (CSR) manufacturer–retailer chain by considering two cases, CSR retailer and CSR manufacturer. In manufacturer-Stackelberg game setting revenue sharing (RS) contract is used to coordinate the channel. It is found that CSR retailer’s perfect welfare maximizing motive resolves channel conflict, otherwise RS contract coordinates the channel. Wholesale price of RS contract is higher than marginal production cost above a threshold of CSR in one case and is negative above a threshold of CSR in the other. Also, CSR manufacturer’s pure profit is negative above a threshold of CSR. |
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| Keywords: | Channel coordination Revenue sharing contract Corporate social responsibility |
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