寻租、过度投资与地方保护

过度投资和地方保护一直是困扰中国经济发展的顽疾。由于这些行为的主体均是地方政府,很多文献试图从政府的角度来解释这两个现象,但是,这些解释与观察到的现实之间有很多差异。在本文中,为了更好的解释过度投资和地方保护现象,我们考虑了寻租动机对于地方政府行为的影响。在考虑了寻租动机后,我们发现,本地企业的最初的决策产能大于后期实际利用的产能。也就是说,存在我们通常说的产能过剩。为了利用这部分未被利用的产能,一个办法是本地企业独占市场,排挤外地厂商,要达到这一目的,只能通过提高外地厂商的成本,也就是实行地方保护主义。

Rent-seeking, Excessive Investment and Local Protection

Excessive investment and local protectionism have trouble the development of China's economy a lot. Many previous researches tried to explain, but the theory they developed is different from the real situation. In order to better understand the excessive investment and local protectionism,this paper took rent-seeking motive of local government into consideration. We found that there exists a surplus production capability. In order to use all the production capability efficiently,local protectionism was carried out.