Mixed equilibria in games of strategic complementarities |
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Authors: | Federico Echenique |
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Affiliation: | 1.Universidad Torcuato Di Tella, Mi?ones 2177, C1428ATG Buenos Aires, ARGENTINA,AR |
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Abstract: | Summary. The literature on games of strategic complementarities (GSC) has focused on pure strategies. I introduce mixed strategies and show that, when strategy spaces are one-dimensional, the complementarities framework extends to mixed strategies ordered by first-order stochastic dominance. In particular, the mixed extension of a GSC is a GSC, the full set of equilibria is a complete lattice and the extremal equilibria (smallest and largest) are in pure strategies. The framework does not extend when strategy spaces are multi-dimensional. I also update learning results for GSC using stochastic fictitious play. Received: October 16, 2000; revised version: March 7, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" I am very grateful to Robert Anderson, David Blackwell, Aaron Edlin, Peter De Marzo, Ted O'Donoghue, Matthew Rabin, Ilya Segal, Chris Shannon, Clara Wang and Federico Weinschelbaum for comments and advise. |
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Keywords: | and Phrases: Supermodular games Strategic complementarities Mixed strategy equilibria Learning. |
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