An Adversarial Ethic for Business: or When Sun-Tzu Met the Stakeholder

In the economic literature on the firm, especially in the transaction–cost tradition, a sharp distinction is drawn between so-called “market transactions” and “administered transactions.” This distinction is of enormous importance for business ethics, since market transactions are governed by the competitive logic of the market, whereas administered transactions are subject to the cooperative norms that govern collective action in a bureaucracy. The widespread failure to distinguish between these two types of transactions, and thus to distinguish between adversarial and non-adversarial relations, has led many business ethicists to develop a “uniform” moral code. Yet in market transactions, the checks and balances built into the system of commercial exchange are such as to permit more instrumental forms of behavior. In administered transactions, by contrast, these checks and balances are absent, and thus the institutional context calls for much greater exercise of moral restraint. In this paper, I begin the task of developing an adversarial ethic for business. According to this view, the competitive environment licenses a greater range of “self-interested” behavior, but also imposes its own constraints on the strategies that firms may adopt in the pursuit of their interests. Joseph Heath is Associate Professor in the Department of Philosophy and the Centre for Ethics at the University of Toronto. He is the author of three books: Communicative Action and Rational Choice (MIT Press, 2001), The Efficient Society (Penguin, 2001), and with Andrew Potter. The Rebel Sell (HarperCollins, 2004). His research focuses on practical rationality, normative economics, and critical theory.