Epsilon Cores of Games with Limited Side Payments: Nonemptiness and Equal Treatment |
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| Authors: | Alexander Kovalenkov Myrna Holtz Wooders |
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| Institution: | a Department of Economics, Gardner Hall, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, North Carolina, 27599-3305;b Department of Economics, University of Toronto, 150 St. George Street, Toronto, M5S 3G7, Canada;c Department of Economics, University of Warwick, Coventry, CV4 7AL, United Kingdom |
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| Abstract: | We introduce the concept of a parameterized collection of games with limited side payments, ruling out large transfers of utility, and demonstrate conditions ensuring that a game with limited side payments has a nonempty -core. Our main result is that, when some degree of side-paymentness within nearly-effective small groups is assumed and large transfers are prohibited, then all payoffs in the -core treat similar players similarly. A bound on the distance between -core payoffs of any two similar players is given in terms of the parameters describing the game. These results add to the literature showing that games with many players and small effective groups have the properties of competitive markets. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C71, C78, D71. |
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| Keywords: | cooperative games equal treatment club theory core convergence games without side payments (NTU games) large games approximate cores effective small groups parameterized collections of games |
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