| 管理层权力与高管薪酬粘性 |
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| 引用本文： | 高文亮,罗宏,程培先. 管理层权力与高管薪酬粘性[J]. 经济经纬, 2011, 0(6) |
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| 作者姓名： | 高文亮 罗宏 程培先 |
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| 作者单位： | 河北金融学院会计系;西南财经大学会计学院; |
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| 基金项目： | 国家社科基金(10XJL012)的阶段性成果 |
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| 摘 要： | 最优契约论与管理权力论是目前管理者激励领域研究的两种主要理论基础。我国上市公司高管薪酬与国外资本市场上公司高管薪酬一样具有粘性特征,这与最优契约论的观点不符。薪酬粘性是指高管薪酬的业绩敏感性存在不对称的特征,业绩上升时薪酬的增加幅度显著高于业绩下降时薪酬的减少幅度。笔者研究发现,管理层权力型企业的高管薪酬显著高于非管理层权力型企业的高管薪酬,并具有更高薪酬粘性。
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| 关 键 词： | 管理层权力论 薪酬粘性 异常薪酬 |
Managerial Power and Executive Compensation Stickiness |
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| GAO Wen-liang,LUO Hong,CHENG Pei-xian. Managerial Power and Executive Compensation Stickiness[J]. Economic Survey, 2011, 0(6) |
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| Authors: | GAO Wen-liang LUO Hong CHENG Pei-xian |
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| Affiliation: | GAO Wen-liang1,LUO Hong2,CHENG Pei-xian1(1.Accounting Department,Hebei Finance University,Baoding 071051,China,2.School of Accounting,Southwestern University of Finance and Economics,Chengdu 611130,China) |
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| Abstract: | Optimal contract theory and managerial power theory are the two main theoretical bases in the research field of the incentives of managers.Just like the managerial compensation in foreign capital market,the executive compensation in the listed companies of our country has the characteristic of stickiness,which does not match with the view of optimal contract theory.Compensation stickiness refers to that the sensitivity of executive compensation to performance has the asymmetry feature.When performance incre... |
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| Keywords: | theory of managerial power compensation stickiness unusual compensation |
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