不确定性条件下董事会监督管理层行为研究

董事会是代替股东监督管理层的主要机构，根据管理层的能力、努力程度和业绩作出监督决策。但在实际监督中,一方面信息不对称导致道德风险和逆向选择，另一方面不确定性因素也会影响监督决策强度，进而影响业绩。文章由不确定性理论研究出发，通过对2011年上市公司截面数据分析，用直接监督行为（董事会次数）和监督结果（高管薪酬、盈余管理）以及ROA作为被解释变量,从内部不确定性和外部不确定性两方面考察不确定性条件下董事会监督管理层的行为以及对业绩的影响。实证结果显示团队异质性与高管薪酬显著负相关，与业绩负相关；业务复杂性和规模与高管薪酬和业绩负相关;独立董事构成对监督和业绩影响不显著。而董事会会议和盈余管理与这些变量没有表现出相关关系。此外，财务危机导致的不确定性对监督强度和业绩都有显著负相关关系。总体说来，不确定性弱化了监督强度，与业绩负相关。

The Research of Board Monitoring Behavior under Uncertainty

Board of director is the major mechanism for monitoring managers and working our decisions based on the managerial capability, effort, and the performance of the firms. But the monitoring behavior will be limited by information asymmetry and uncertain factors, and then affect the firm performance. Based on the uncertainty theory, this paper investigates the board monitoring behavior in two aspects: internal uncertainty and external uncertainty. In empirical analysis, the dependent variable is the direct monitoring behavior (times of board meeting) and monitoring result (high-level personnel payment and surplus management).The empirical result illustrates that: the team heterogeneity is negative with managers payment and firm performance. The complexity of business is negative with managers payment and firm performance, the composition of board of director is not related with the payment and performance. Times of board meeting and surplus management are not related with team heterogeneity, the complexity of business and firm scale. Furthermore, financial crisis is negative with monitoring and performance. Overall, uncertainty weakens the board monitoring strength and affects the firm performance.