| Abstract: | The traditional view of appointments to executive agencies isthat the president has virtual carte blanche in the selectionof personnel for his "team." Yet many formal models of appointmentsuggest that presidents must accommodate the policy preferencesof senators when making nominations. Several empirical studieshave confirmed that legislative preferences are a significantdeterminant of the ideology of appointees, but these studieshave focused on appointments to the federal judiciary; the researchhas not addressed appointments to executive agencies. Appointmentsto executive agencies from 1936 to 1996 are examined, by employinga special sample of appointees to those positions—thosewho have served in Congress at some point in their careers.For these "bridging" individuals, it is possible to analyzestrictly comparable measures of ideology for the appointees,their nominating presidents, and the senators who voted to confirmthem. A linear regression analysis provides significant supportfor the hypothesis that appointee ideology is affected by variationin the ideological tilt in Congress. |
