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On the optimal taxation of common-pool resources |
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| Authors: | G. Kossioris M. Plexousakis A. Xepapadeas A. de Zeeuw |
| Affiliation: | aDepartment of Mathematics, University of Crete and Institute of Applied and Computational Mathematics, FORTH, Heraklion 71110, Greece;bDepartment of Applied Mathematics, University of Crete and Institute of Applied and Computational Mathematics, FORTH, Heraklion 71110, Greece;cAthens University of Economics and Business, 76 Patission Street, Athens 104 34, Greece;dTSC, Tilburg University, The Netherlands |
| Abstract: | Recent research developments in common-pool resource models emphasize the importance of links with ecological systems and the presence of non-linearities, thresholds and multiple steady states. In a recent paper Kossioris et al. (2008) develop a methodology for deriving feedback Nash equilibria for non-linear differential games and apply this methodology to a common-pool resource model of a lake where pollution corresponds to benefits and at the same time affects the ecosystem services. This paper studies the structure of optimal state-dependent taxes that steer the combined economic-ecological system towards the trajectory of optimal management, and provides an algorithm for calculating such taxes. |
| Keywords: | Differential games Non-linear feedback Nash equilibria Ecosystems Optimal state-dependent tax |
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