Proto-coalition bargaining and the core |
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Authors: | Yves Breitmoser |
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Institution: | 1. EUV Frankfurt (Oder), Postfach 1786, 15207, Frankfurt (Oder), Germany
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Abstract: | In the proto-coalition model of government formation, formateur F appoints a proto-coalition and asks its members whether to start negotiating a coalition contract. If all accept, then the proto-coalition forms and starts negotiating; otherwise, a caretaker government assumes office. I extend this model by allowing F to revise the chosen proto-coalition after rejections, that he states pre-conditions for the subsequent negotiations, and that F??s opponents may publicly pre-commit to accept/reject certain proposals. The set of equilibrium outcomes is identified as the core if F??s opponents can pre-commit and as the convex hull of the core if they cannot pre-commit credibly. This extended model eliminates two flaws of the standard model: it explains why F cannot always install his favored coalition (whatever the status quo) and why ??important?? coalition members may have more bargaining power in the subsequent negotiations than others. |
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