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Rebates in a Bertrand game
Authors:Nora Szech  Philipp Weinschenk
Affiliation:1. Department of Economics, University of Bamberg, Feldkirchenstr. 21, 96052 Bamberg, Germany;2. Bonn Graduate School of Economics and Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Kurt-Schumacher-Str. 10, 53113 Bonn, Germany
Abstract:We study a price competition game in which customers are heterogeneous in the rebates they get from either of two firms. We characterize the transition between competitive pricing (without rebates), mixed strategy equilibrium (for intermediate rebates), and monopoly pricing (for larger rebates).
Keywords:Rebates   Price competition   Bertrand paradox   Golden ratio   Market segmentation
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