Population monotonic and strategy-proof mechanisms respecting welfare lower bounds |
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Authors: | Duygu Yengin |
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Institution: | School of Economics, The University of Adelaide, 10 Pulteney Street, Room 4.48, SA 5005, Australia |
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Abstract: | The significance of population monotonicity and welfare bounds is well-recognized in the fair division literature. We consider the welfare bounds that are central to the fair allocation literature, namely, the identical-preferences lower-bound, individual rationality, the stand-alone lower-bound, and k-fairness. We characterize population monotonic and incentive compatible mechanisms which allocate an object efficiently and respect a welfare lower bound chosen in the fair allocation problem of allocating a collectively owned indivisible good or bad when monetary transfers are possible and preferences are private information. |
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Keywords: | Welfare bounds The identical-preferences lower-bound Population monotonicity Allocation of an indivisible good and money The Groves mechanisms Strategy-proofness |
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