| 中央政府救助对国有银行不良贷款影响的博弈分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 宋涛,唐德善. 中央政府救助对国有银行不良贷款影响的博弈分析[J]. 特区经济, 2006, 0(12): 22-23 |
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| 作者姓名： | 宋涛 唐德善 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 河海大学,商学院,江苏,南京,210098
2. 河海大学,水利水电工程学院,江苏,南京,210098 |
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| 摘 要： | 本文运用不完全信息动态博弈,分析了中央政府对国有银行进行救助对国有银行不良贷款的影响。结果表明,中央政府救助会增加国有银行不良贷款形成的概率。
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| 关 键 词： | 不完全信息动态博弈 中央政府救助 国有银行 不良贷款 |
Game playing analysis of central government support''''s influence on state bank''''s bad loan |
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| Song Tao,Tang De Shan. Game playing analysis of central government support''''s influence on state bank''''s bad loan[J]. Special Zone Economy, 2006, 0(12): 22-23 |
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| Authors: | Song Tao Tang De Shan |
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| Abstract: | In this paper, we analyzed the influence of central government assistance on non - performing loans of state - owned banks by means of incomplete information dynamic game. We considered that central goveminent assistance will increase the formation probability of non - performing loans of state - owned banks in China. |
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| Keywords: | incomplete information dynamic game central government assistance state - owned banks non - performing loans |
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