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LONG‐TERM AND SHORT‐TERM CONTRACT IN A MIXED MARKET*
Authors:AKIRA NISHIMORI  HIKARU OGAWA
Abstract:With a two‐period mixed oligopolistic framework, this paper analyses the interaction between the length of incentive contracts and market behaviour. Assuming an environment in which firms choose either a long‐term or short‐term contract, we examine how contracts differ between public and private firms. The results show that the contracts would differ completely among firms; public firm prefers to make a short‐term contract while private firm makes a long‐term contract.
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