| Abstract: | Mercosur appears as an interesting case study for analyzingthe determinants of exceptions in regional trade agreements.Its member countries—Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, andUruguay—intended to make Mercosur a full customs unionby January 1995. This goal turned out to be too ambitious, andthe Protocol of Ouro Preto and other agreements signed in December1994 led to a hybrid solution. Overall, out of a total of 9,119tariff lines, around 30 percent are subject, in at least onemember country, to either external deviations from the commonexternal tariff or internal deviations from free trade. Thusan important set of holes remains under the existing agreement,leading some authors to consider Mercosur an incomplete customsunion. This article compares the results of the theoretical literatureon endogenous tariff formation with evidence from Mercosur.The results show that Mercosur's common external tariff andmember countries' deviations from it and from internal freetrade can be explained by sector or industry lobbying as predictedby the endogenous tariff literature. If a viable political economyis a key to success, then Mercosur is here to stay. |
