Price versus Quantity in a Duopolistic Market with Bargaining over Managerial Delegation Contracts |
| |
Authors: | Yasuhiko Nakamura |
| |
Affiliation: | Nihon University, Chiyoda‐ku, Tokyo, Japan |
| |
Abstract: | This paper studies the endogenous choices of strategic contracts in a duopoly with bargaining between the owner and manager of each firm over the content of the managerial delegation contract. We show that when the bargaining power of the manager relative to that of the owner within each firm is sufficiently high, quantity competition based on the quantity contracts chosen by the owners of both firms can be uniquely observed in the equilibrium, whereas quantity competition and price competition can be observed in the equilibrium when this relative bargaining power is sufficiently low. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. |
| |
Keywords: | |
|
|