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Evolution, bargaining, and time preferences
Authors:Jack Robles
Affiliation:(1) Victoria University Wellington, PO Box 600, Wellington, 6140, New Zealand
Abstract:I include a role for time preferences within a version of the Young (J Econ Theory 59:145–168, 1993b) evolutionary model of bargaining. With or without time preferences, the stochastic stable convention yields a generalized version of the Nash (Econometrica 18:155–162, 1950) Bargaining Solution. When time preferences are added to the model, agents’ discount factors enter into the stochastically stable convention in a natural manner. That is, an agent’s discount factor acts as a bargaining weight within the Nash Bargaining Solution. By taking appropriate limits, an evolutionary foundation for the Rubinstein (Econometrica 50:97–110, 1982) Bargaining Solution is provided. I thank Lew Evans, Jack Leach, Collin Starkweather, Aaron Strong, a referee and associate editor. All errors are my own.
Keywords:Bargaining  Evolution  Rubinstein solution
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