Rationing rules and Bertrand-Edgeworth equilibria in large markets期刊界 All Journals 搜尽天下杂志传播学术成果专业期刊搜索期刊信息化学术搜索

Rationing rules and Bertrand-Edgeworth equilibria in large markets

Affiliation:	1. Department of Business Management, Tatung University, 40, Sec. 3, Zhongshan N. Rd. Zhongshan District, Taipei City 10452, Taiwan;2. Department of Economics, National Central University, No. 300, Jhongda Road, Jhongli City, Taoyuan County 32001, Taiwan;1. Université Paris I, CES, PSE, France;2. CNRS-University Paris-Défense, OFCE, CEPR, France;3. Neoma Business School, 1 rue du Maréchal Juin – BP 215, 76825 Mont-Saint-Aignan Cedex, France;1. EPEE, University of Evry, University Paris-Saclay, France;2. IPAG Business School, PSE, CNRS, TIMAS, APD, France;3. Montpellier Business School – Montpellier Research in Management, France

Abstract:	In a market with concave downward sloping demand and symmetric firms which compete in prices with constant marginal costs and capacity limits it is shown that the supports of the symmetric (mixed strategy) Nash equilibria converge to the unique competitive price provided that unsatisfied demand is allocated according to the surplus-maximizing rationing rule.

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