| 中国上市公司MBO博弈模型的构建与应用 |
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| 引用本文： | 张志柏.中国上市公司MBO博弈模型的构建与应用[J].商业研究,2006(17):113-116. |
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| 作者姓名： | 张志柏 |
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| 作者单位： | 肇庆学院,财经系,广东,肇庆,526061 |
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| 摘 要： | 上市公司MBO是一个复杂的动态博弈过程。MBO能否成功取决于实施方、反对方与主管方三者的博弈策略选择,而每个博弈方的策略选择又受其位置、习惯和经济社会环境的影响。中国的上市公司构建了MBO博弈模型,并且给出了该博弈的子博弈完美纳什均衡。依据博弈模型,对伊利股份MBO的失败和鄂尔多斯MBO的成功就有了理论解释。
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| 关 键 词： | 上市公司 MBO(管理层收购) 博弈 |
| 文章编号： | 1001-148X（2006）17-0113-04 |
| 收稿时间： | 2005-12-14 |
| 修稿时间： | 2005年12月14 |
The Application of MBO Game Model to Chinese Listed Companies |
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| ZHANG Zhi-bai.The Application of MBO Game Model to Chinese Listed Companies[J].Commercial Research,2006(17):113-116. |
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| Authors: | ZHANG Zhi-bai |
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| Institution: | Department of Finance and Economics, Zhaoqing University, Guangdong,526061, China |
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| Abstract: | MBO in listed companies is a very complicated dynamic process,which involves a game of deciding on approprrate strategies among the parties of being for or against MBO,and also the administrate sectors.Their strategies are affected by their position,habit,and soci-economic listed companies,the paper concludes the Nash Equillebrium based on the case studies on Yili and Eerduosi. |
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| Keywords: | listed companies MBO game |
| 本文献已被 CNKI 维普 万方数据 等数据库收录！ |
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