多个大股东、内部薪酬差距与并购效率

以2007—2019年中国上市公司为样本，考察多个大股东对并购效率的影响及内部薪酬差距的调节效应。研究发现：首先，存在多个大股东的上市公司能够在减少并购决策的同时提高并购绩效，实现了更高的并购效率，且多个大股东的监督越有力，并购效率越高；其次，考察内部薪酬差距在多个大股东与并购效率的调节作用，将股东、管理层、员工3个层面结合，结果表明内部薪酬差距抑制了多个大股东对并购效率的积极影响；最后，在市场化程度高的地区多个大股东更能提升并购效率。研究结果不仅从并购效率的角度丰富了多个大股东的经济影响，也对改善股权结构、优化薪酬设计及提高并购效率具有重要的参考意义。

Multiple Major Shareholders, Internal Compensation Gap and M&A Efficiency

Taking Chinese listed companies from 2007 to 2019 as research sample, the influence of multiple major shareholders on the efficiency of mergers and acquisitions and the moderating effect of internal salary gaps are examined . The study found that: firstly, listed companies with multiple major shareholders can reduce M&A decisions while improving M&A performance and achieve higher M&A efficiency; and the stronger the supervision of multiple major shareholders, the higher the M&A efficiency. Secondly,the moderating effect of the internal salary gap on the efficiency of mergers and acquisitions between multiple major shareholders, combining the three levels of shareholders, management and employees, the results show that the internal salary gap inhibits the positive impact of multiple major shareholders on the efficiency of mergers and acquisitions.Finally, in the marketization ,multiple major shareholders in a high-level regions can improve the efficiency of mergers and acquisitions. The research results not only enrich the economic influence of multiple major shareholders from the perspective of M&A efficiency, but also have important reference significance for improving ownership structure, optimizing salary design and improving M&A efficiency.