上下游区域间环境保护与生态补偿的博弈研究

基于生态补偿具有经济效应和公众参与效应的特征，通过引入博弈理论，系统研究上下游区域间进行环境保护和生态补偿时的特征，通过定义影响博弈双方行为选择的具体变量，建立上下游环境保护与生态补偿成本收益的博弈模型。研究结果表明：若上游区域实施的策略为保护环境进而延缓经济发展，将不实施保护环境策略；若下游区域需要给与的补偿较大，将不实施生态补偿的措施；上游区域实施环境保护策略且下游区域采取生态补偿措施，需要建立在一定的条件基础上；上游初始经济状况越弱，上游区域倾向于进行环境保护的意愿度更小；下游对上游的补偿越大，下游区域采取补偿措施的意愿度将有所减少；下游区初始经济状况越好，下游区域采取补偿措施的意愿度越高；对上下游利益相关体进行生态补偿博弈研究时，必须考虑各利益体的自身发展状况。

Game study on environmental protection-ecological compensation between upstream and downstream regions

Since ecological compensation has economic effects and public participation effects, based on this feature, when systematically studying upstream and downstream environmental protection and ecological compensation, by defining specific variables that affect the behavior choices of both parties in the game, an environmental protection-ecological compensation between upstream and downstream is established the game model of cost-benefit. The results show that in order to protect the environment and delay economic development, the upstream will not implement the environmental protection strategy.If the downstream area needs to give a large compensation, it will not implement the ecological compensation measures; the implementation of environmental protection strategies in upstream areas and the adoption of ecological compensation measures in downstream areas need to be based on certain conditions. The weaker the initial economic situation of the upstream, the lower the willingness of the upstream region to carry out environmental protection; the greater the compensation from the downstream to the upstream, the greater the compensation in the downstream the willingness to take measures will decrease.The better the initial economic situation in the downstream area, the higher the willingness to take compensation measures in the downstream area. When conducting ecological compensation game research on upstream and downstream stakeholders, we must consider their own development status.