融资激励和融资约束对PPP模式下公共产品提供效率的影响——基于不完全契约理论的一般均衡分析

通过构建不完全契约理论下的一般均衡模型,对比分析了PPP模式中的融资约束和融资激励对公共产品提供效率和社会福利的影响,并探讨了融资约束条件下的效率损失。结果显示:私人融资的专业性可以提高公共产品合意程度,但是私人部门的融资约束会抵消其专业性带来的好处,导致社会福利损失。最后针对民营企业参与PPP项目对政府提出建议:必须打破融资约束和制度歧视,完善和规范金融市场,在公平、竞争的市场环境下引入专业机构参与公共产品提供的各个领域。

Effect of Financial Constraint and Financial Incentive on Supply Efficient of Providing Public Goods in Public-Private-Partnership Mode: General Equilibrium Analysis Based on Incomplete Contracting Theory

This paper compares the effects of financial constraint and financial incentive in public-private-partnership(PPP) mode on the supply efficient of public goods and social welfare,and analyzes the efficiency loss under financial constraints by constructing a general equilibrium model based on the incomplete contracting theory.The result shows as follows:depending on the professionalization,financial incentives from private sectors could improve the productivity of public goods,but financial constraints eliminate the benefit of professionalization,which results in the loss of social welfare.Finally,it suggests that the government should break the financial constraints and institutional discrimination,and improve financial market,and introduce specialized private sectors into the various industries of public goods in fair and competitive market environment.