A note on Kuhn’s Theorem with ambiguity averse players |
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Authors: | Gaurab Aryal Ronald Stauber |
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Institution: | 1. The University of Chicago, Department of Economics, 1126 E. 59th Street, Chicago, IL 60637, United States;2. Research School of Economics, Australian National University, ACT 0200, Australia |
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Abstract: | Kuhn’s Theorem shows that extensive games with perfect recall can equivalently be analyzed using mixed or behavioral strategies, as long as players are expected utility maximizers. This note constructs an example that illustrates the limits of Kuhn’s Theorem in an environment with ambiguity averse players who use a maxmin decision rule and full Bayesian updating. |
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Keywords: | C72 D81 |
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