Third-party punishment and counter-punishment in one-shot interactions |
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| Authors: | Loukas Balafoutas Kristoffel Grechenig Nikos Nikiforakis |
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| Affiliation: | 1. Department of Public Finance, Universitätsstrasse 15, 6020 Innsbruck, Austria;2. Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Kurt Schumacher Strasse 10, 53113 Bonn, Germany;3. New York University Abu Dhabi, P.O. Box 129188, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates |
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| Abstract: | This paper presents experimental evidence from a simple three-person game showing that many individuals are willing to avenge third-party punishment in one-shot interactions. The threat of counter-punishment has a large negative effect on the willingness of third parties to punish selfish behavior. In spite of this, the extent of selfish behavior is identical to that in a treatment without counter-punishment opportunities. We discuss explanations for this puzzling finding. |
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| Keywords: | C92 D70 H41 |
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