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Asymmetric group loans,non-assortative matching and adverse selection
Authors:Shubhashis Gangopadhyay  Robert Lensink
Institution:1. India Development Foundation, India;2. Shiv Nadar University, India;3. University of Gothenburg, Sweden;4. Faculty of Economics and Business, University of Groningen, The Netherlands;5. Development Economics Group, Wageningen University, The Netherlands
Abstract:This paper shows that an asymmetric group debt contract, where one borrower co-signs for another, but not vice versa, leads to heterogeneous matching. The analysis suggests that micro finance organizations can achieve the first best by offering asymmetric group contracts.
Keywords:D8  G2  O1
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