The nucleolus of large majority games |
| |
| Authors: | Sascha Kurz Stefan Napel Andreas Nohn |
| |
| Affiliation: | 1. Department of Mathematics, University of Bayreuth, Germany;2. Department of Economics, University of Bayreuth, Germany;3. Public Choice Research Centre, University of Turku, Finland |
| |
| Abstract: | Members of a shareholder meeting or legislative committee have greater or smaller voting power than meets the eye if the nucleolus of the induced majority game differs from the voting weight distribution. We establish a new sufficient condition for the weight and power distributions to be equal, and we characterize the limit behavior of the nucleolus in case all relative weights become small. |
| |
| Keywords: | C61 C71 |
| 本文献已被 ScienceDirect 等数据库收录！ |
|
