Corporate Control around the World |
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| Authors: | GUR AMINADAV ELIAS PAPAIOANNOU |
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| Affiliation: | Gur Aminadav is with London Business School. Elias Papaioannou is with London Business School and CEPR. We would like to thank two anonymous referees, the Associate Editor, the Editor (Amit Seru), Julian Franks, Rafael La Porta, Sebnem Kalemli-Ozcan, Richard Portes, and Andrei Shleifer for useful comments and valuable feedback. We would also like to thank Sebastian Hohmann, Irene Díaz de Aguilar Hidalgo, Giorgio Chiovelli, and Luís Fonseca for their help on various parts of the paper. All errors are our sole responsibility. We have read The Journal of Finance disclosure policy and have no conflicts of interest to disclose. |
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| Abstract: | We study corporate control tracing controlling shareholders for thousands of listed firms from 127 countries over 2004 to 2012. Government and family control is pervasive in civil-law countries. Blocks are commonplace, but less so in common-law countries. These patterns apply to large, medium, and small firms. In contrast, the development-control nexus is heterogeneous; strong for large but absent for small firms. Control correlates strongly with shareholder protection, the stringency of employment contracts and unions power. Conversely, the correlations with creditor rights, legal formalism, and entry regulation appear weak. These patterns support both legal origin and political theories of financial development. |
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