中央银行的宏观监管职能:经济效果与影响因素分析

文章以跨国数据为基础,对中央银行是否应分离银行监管职能这一问题进行了系统的实证分析。结果表明,在中央银行未分离或未完全分离银行监管职能的国家,其金融稳定性通常更高,经济增速更快,而且未出现明显的"通货膨胀倾向"。这意味着金融监管的独立性并不是简单地将监管职能从中央银行分离的问题,中央银行的独立性也并不必然排斥其继续实施金融监管职能。通过将货币政策和金融监管的兼容性置于政治经济学框架下加以解读,文章发现真正影响金融监管实际独立性的并非监管主体的设置问题,而是更广泛地依赖于不同的政治制度条件。上述结论表明,如何在既定的政治制度和政策框架下切实加强货币政策和金融监管的协调与配合才是问题的核心和关键。

On Macro Supervisory Function of Central Banks:Economic Influences and Influential Factors

Based on the cross-country data,this paper empirically analyzes the issue about whether the central bank should separate the function of bank supervision.The results show that the countries whose central banks do not or not completely separate the function of bank supervision have more stable financial systems and higher economic growth,and do not have a significant inflation tendency,which imply that financial supervisory independence is not just the issue about separating supervisory function from the central bank and the independence of the central bank does not necessarily exclude its continued implementation of financial supervision.It introduces the compatibility problem of monetary policies and financial supervision into the politically economic framework and finds that the real independence of financial supervision is really affected by politically institutional conditions rather than the determination of the supervisor.The conclusions abovementioned indicate that how to strengthen the coordination between monetary policies and financial supervision under established political institutionos and policy framework is the key to the issue.