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Risk Aversion and Tacit Collusion in a Bertrand Duopoly Experiment
Authors:Lisa R Anderson  Beth A Freeborn  Jason P Hulbert
Institution:1. Department of Economics, College of William and Mary, Williamsburg, VA, USA
2. Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Commission, 600 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Washington, DC, 20580, USA
3. Department of Economics, University of Maryland, College Park, MD, USA
Abstract:Recent research has found significant differences in the ability of subjects tacitly to collude, depending on the nature of the strategic interaction (e.g., Cournot vs. Bertrand or substitutes vs. complements goods). We investigate the relationship between subject-specific risk tolerance and tacit collusion in Bertrand duopoly experiments. We find that less risk-averse subjects price higher than do their more risk-averse counterparts, but this relationship is only significant when actions are strategic substitutes. When we analyze pair-level data, we find that non-risk averse subject pairs price significantly higher than do risk averse and mixed pairs in both the substitutes and complements treatments.
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