Reputation and imperfect information |
| |
Authors: | David M Kreps Robert Wilson |
| |
Institution: | Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, Stanford, California 94305 USA |
| |
Abstract: | A common observation in the informal literature of economics (and elsewhere) is that is multistage “games,” players may seek early in the game to acquire a reputation for being “tough” or “benevolent” or something else. But this phenomenon is not observed in some formal game-theoretic analyses of finite games, such as Selten's finitely repeated chain-store game or in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma. We reexamine Selten's model, adding to it a “small” amount of imperfect (or incomplete) information about players' payoffs, and we find that this addition is sufficient to give rise to the “reputation effect” that one intuitively expects. |
| |
Keywords: | |
本文献已被 ScienceDirect 等数据库收录! |
|