Job Matching and Coalition Formation with Utility or Disutility of Co-workers |
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| Institution: | 1. Department of Economics, North Carolina State University, United States of America;2. Department of Economics, Finance, and Legal Studies, University of Alabama, United States of America;3. School of Economics, University of Sydney, Australia;1. Département de Sciences Économiques and CIREQ, Université de Montréal, C.P. 6128 Succursale Centre-Ville, Montréal, Québec H3C 3J7, Canada;2. Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona and Barcelona GSE, Departament d''Economia i Història Econòmica, Edifici B. Campus UAB, 08193 Cerdanyola del Vallès (Barcelona), Spain |
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| Abstract: | This paper studies the job matching market in Kelso and Crawford (1982), Econometrica50, 1483–1504, with one exception, that co-workers may generate utility or disutility in the workplace. We provide a simple idea to show how a great number of sufficient conditions for a nonempty core in the literature can be extended to this labor market. A generalized competitive equilibrium with a tax/subsidy system is also discussed. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: D71. |
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