Evolutionary Learning in Signalling Games |
| |
| Institution: | 1. Institute of Nuclear Sciences Vin?a, University of Belgrade, Belgrade, Serbia;2. Department of Theoretical Physics, Jo?ef Stefan Institute, Ljubljana, Slovenia;1. Dipartimento di Matematica “Tullio Levi-Civita”, Università di Padova, I-35121 Padova, Italy;2. Dipartimento di Ingegneria dell''Informazione, Università di Padova, I-35131 Padova, Italy;3. Université de Rennes, CNRS, IRMAR - UMR 6625, F-35000 Rennes, France |
| |
| Abstract: | We study equilibrium selection by evolutionary learning in monotone two-type signalling games. The learning process we study extends that introduced by Young (1993, Econometrica61, 57–84) to deal with incomplete information and sequential moves; it thus involves stochastic trembles. For vanishing trembles the process gives rise to strong selection among sequential equilibria: if the game has separating equilibria, then in the long run only play according to the so-called Riley equilibrium will be observed frequently. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C72. |
| |
| Keywords: | |
| 本文献已被 ScienceDirect 等数据库收录！ |
|
