Coalitional Strategy-Proofness in Economies with Single-Dipped Preferences and the Assignment of an Indivisible Object |
| |
Affiliation: | 1. Research Center for Future Design, Kochi University of Technology, 2-22 Eikokuji, Kochi 780-8515, Japan;2. Research Institute for Economics and Business Administration, Kobe University, 2-1 Rokkodai, Kobe, Hyogo 657-8501, Japan;3. School of Economics, Shanghai University, 99 Shangda Road, BaoShan District, Shanghai 200444, China |
| |
Abstract: | We study two allocation models. In the first model, we consider the problem of allocating an infinitely divisible commodity among agents with single-dipped preferences. In the second model, a degenerate case of the first one, we study the allocation of an indivisible object to a group of agents. Our main result is the characterization of the class of Pareto optimal and coalitionally strategy-proof allocation rules. Alternatively, this class of rules, which largely consists of serially dictatorial components, can be characterized by Pareto optimality, strategy-proofness, and weak non-bossiness (in terms of welfare). Furthermore, we study properties of fairness such as anonymity and no-envy. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D63, D71. |
| |
Keywords: | |
本文献已被 ScienceDirect 等数据库收录! |
|