A One-Stage Model of Link Formation and Payoff Division |
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| Institution: | 1. Department of Technology Management, Technische Universiteit Eindhoven, P.O. Box 513, 5600 MB, Eindhoven, The Netherlands;2. Department of Economics, 435 PLC, 1285, University of Oregon, Eugene, Oregon, 97403-1285;1. Departament de Matemàtica Econòmica, Financera i Actuarial, Universitat de Barcelona and BEAT, Spain;2. Departamento de Estatística, Análise Matemática e Optimización, Universidade de Santiago de Compostela, Spain;3. Departamento de Estatística e Investigación Operativa, Universidade de Vigo, Spain;1. Computer Science Department, Université de Mons (UMONS), place du Parc 20, B-7000, Mons, Belgium;2. Computer Science Department, Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB), Campus de la Plaine, CP212, B-1050, Bruxelles, Belgium |
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| Abstract: | In this paper we introduce a strategic form model in which cooperation structures and divisions of the payoffs are determined simultaneously. We analyze the cooperation structures and payoff divisions that result according to Nash equilibria, strong Nash equilibria, and coalition proof Nash equilibria. We find that no cycle will be formed if a player claims a positive amount for the formation of one of its links and that a player does not necessarily profit from a central position in a cooperation structure. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C71, C72. |
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