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国有商业企业管理弱化的经济博弈分析
引用本文:周兵.国有商业企业管理弱化的经济博弈分析[J].中国流通经济,2005,19(9).
作者姓名:周兵
作者单位:重庆工商大学长江上游经济研究中心,重庆市,400067
摘    要:本文采用博弈理论和方法从国有商业企业治理的角度出发,探讨了国有商业企业管理弱化问题。文章认为,国有商业企业由于治理结构不完善,政府与国有商业企业之间一般都存在合谋作弊行为,这种局面将最终造成政府对国有商业企业管理的弱化。要克服管理弱化,应尽量降低监控成本,提高监督效率和创新能力;加大违规损失,增大违规风险,提高奖励力度,奖惩并用提高监督效率;谨防出现内部人控制情况,在监督机制设计中必须做到监控主体到位。

关 键 词:国有商业企业  治理结构  纳什均衡  重复博弈

The Economics Analysis of Management Weakening in State-Owned Commercial Enterprises Based on Game Theory
ZHOU Bing.The Economics Analysis of Management Weakening in State-Owned Commercial Enterprises Based on Game Theory[J].China Business and Market,2005,19(9).
Authors:ZHOU Bing
Abstract:From the angle of commercial enterprises governing,the author probes into the problems with state-owned commercial enterprises with the help of game theory and approaches. Because of the imperfections in state-owned commercial ent erprises governing structure,the problem of collusion exists between the governm ent and state-owned commercial enterprises,which in turn leads to management wea kening. To conquer this problem,we should,first,do our best to lower the cost of supervision,improve the efficiency of supervision and the ability of innovation ;second,increase the loss and risk of violation;third,take precautions against insider control.
Keywords:State-owned commercial enterprises  governing structure  nash equilib rium  repeated game
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