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商业银行公司治理中集中型股权结构的问题与对策综述
引用本文:陈德胜,雷家骕,冯宗宪.商业银行公司治理中集中型股权结构的问题与对策综述[J].当代经济管理,2006,28(4):87-91.
作者姓名:陈德胜  雷家骕  冯宗宪
作者单位:1. 西安工业大学,经济管理学院,陕西,西安,710032
2. 清华大学,经济管理学院,北京,100084
3. 西安交通大学金禾经济研究中心,陕西,西安,710049
摘    要:在集中型股权结构的现实背景下,对集中型股权结构对商业银行公司治理风险的控制作用进行了综述性研究。针对大股东对小股东的利益侵害问题、小股东对经理层的监控不利问题、大股东对经理层的监控过度问题以及政府控股型商业银行治理风险的特殊性问题,分别提出如下对策建议:赋予企业内部人剩余收益权和由少数几个大股东分享控制权、由持股数量足够大的大股东对经理层进行监控、分权控制、减少政府对银行的控股数量和干预,以及加强对政府控股型银行的私人监控等。

关 键 词:商业银行  公司治理  股权结构
文章编号:1673-0461(2006)04-0087-05

Problems of and Measures to Centralized Ownership Structure of Commercial Bank Corporate Governance: a Literature Review
CHEN De-sheng,LEI Jia-su,FENG Zong-xian.Problems of and Measures to Centralized Ownership Structure of Commercial Bank Corporate Governance: a Literature Review[J].Contemporary Economic Management,2006,28(4):87-91.
Authors:CHEN De-sheng  LEI Jia-su  FENG Zong-xian
Abstract:Based on the actual situation of centralized ownership structure(COS),this paper summarizes on the control of COS over corporate governance risk of commercial bank.Respective methods are presented to solve the problems,such as,big shareholders infract interests of small shareholders,managers can't be effectively monitored by small shareholders but excessively monitored by big shareholders and special problems exist in the commercial bank controlled by government.The methods are as follows: residual claims should be given to the internal controllers,several big shareholders should share the control rights,the managers should be monitored by big shareholders with enough shares,control rights should be decentralized,shares of and intervene from government should be reduced,and supervision should be enhanced.
Keywords:commercial bank  corporate governance  ownership structure
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