Conjectural variations and evolutionary stability in finite populations |
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Authors: | Wieland Müller Hans-Theo Normann |
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Affiliation: | (1) Department of Economics, Tilburg University, Postbus 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, The Netherlands;(2) Department of Economics, Royal Holloway, Egham, Surrey, TW20 0EX, UK |
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Abstract: | Recently it has been shown that consistent conjectures are evolutionarily stable. In this note we show that this finding depends on the use of the infinite population ESS (Maynard-Smith, Evolution and the theory of games, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 1982). When applying the finite-population ESS (Schaffer, J Theor Biol 132:469–478, 1988) we show that the conjectures surviving in the long run are not consistent. |
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Keywords: | Consistent conjectures Duopoly Evolutionary stability Finite population Indirect evolutionary approach |
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