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基于进化博弈论的生态产业链稳定性研究
引用本文:冯 蕾,孟令琳.基于进化博弈论的生态产业链稳定性研究[J].科技和产业,2011,11(2):47-50.
作者姓名:冯 蕾  孟令琳
作者单位:1. 四川大学经济学院,成都,610065
2. 上海理工大学管理学院,上海,200093
基金项目:四川省国土资源局2010年重点项目
摘    要:运用进化博弈论理论,对生态产业链中上下游企业间的稳定性进行了分析,在分析过程中,认为有两点因素将会对生态产业链的稳定性产生重要影响:①政府可充分发挥其导向作用,制定博弈企业间合作交往的"规则"和"制度"形式,既作为一种激励机制,导向企业的行为,同时也是一种惩罚机制改变企业的收益,约束着企业的策略选择;②在企业间的长期博弈中,十分注重"声誉效应"的影响,"声誉效应"将会是企业间博弈的一种自动惩罚机制,限制着企业背离合作的选择。

关 键 词:生态产业链  稳定性  进化博弈  ESS

A Study on the Stability of Ecological Industry Chain Based on the Evolutionary Game Theory
FENG Lei,MENG Ling-lin.A Study on the Stability of Ecological Industry Chain Based on the Evolutionary Game Theory[J].SCIENCE TECHNOLOGY AND INDUSTRIAL,2011,11(2):47-50.
Authors:FENG Lei  MENG Ling-lin
Institution:FENG Lei1,MENG Ling-lin2(1.School of Economics,Sichuan University,Chengdu 610065,China,2.School of Management,Unversity of Shanghai for Science andTechnology,Shanghai 200093,China)
Abstract:This paper makes an analyses concerning the stability between upstream and downstream enterprises in the ecological industry chain with evolutionary game theory,which could be influenced mainly by two important factors:(I) the government can take good advantage of its orientation role,and regulate the form of therulesand systems in the enterprise cooperation which could act as an incentive mechanism to guide the enterprise action,as well as a punishment mechanism to change the enterprise' profit,and restric...
Keywords:the ecological industry chain  stability  the evolutionary game  ESS  
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