Prejudice, exclusion, and compensating transfers: the economics of ethnic segregation |
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Authors: | Alex Anas |
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Affiliation: | Department of Economics, State University of New York at Buffalo, 405 Fronczak Hall, Amherst, NY 14260, USA |
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Abstract: | Prejudiced groups self-segregate and exclude others. This is observed in South African apartheid, in the exclusion of Eastern European or Muslim immigrants from Western Europe and in ghettos formed by immigrants in many countries. In the United States, minorities (mostly African Americans) are segregated in central cities and wealthier European Americans reside predominantly in the suburbs. A fully closed general equilibrium model of the last case is presented. The model treats land, labor and product markets. Most whites flee the inner city for white-dominated suburbs. This benefits blacks by lowering inner city rents relative to wages. When whites are weakly prejudiced, exclusion from the suburbs hurts whites as well as blacks. But when whites are strongly prejudiced, a lump sum endowment transfer from whites to blacks can split the gains-from-trade: whites can pay transfers to blacks in exchange for blacks accepting exclusion. The transfer needed to compensate blacks is large if blacks are strongly hurt by exclusion and small if they are only slightly hurt. How much transfers to US central cities and to the poor compensate American blacks for the effects of exclusion is an open question. |
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Keywords: | Ethnic segregation Prejudice Exclusion |
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